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LIMITS OF UNION DISCIPLINARY POWER
UNDER FEDERAL LAW
National labor policy has developed on the premise that the most effective way of improving the socioeconomic status of employees is the pooling
of their resources in a "labor organization freely chosen by the majority."'
In order for this collective bargaining system to function, individual interests
must be subordinated to the combined interest of all employees. 2 Within
this framework unions have assumed the power to discipline members for
violating union constitutions or bylaws.3
In upholding such disciplinary action state courts have generally relied
upon the theory that the "union constitution is a contract between the union
and its members." 4 Since the terms of such a contract define the members'
privileges and duties,5 courts normally turn to the union constitution to determine the union's power to discipline specific acts of its members.6 Complicating this approach, however, is the fact that many constitutions contain
general provisions conceivably applicable to a wide variety of activities.
Under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 8 union members were given the
1. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
2. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
3. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967). "That power is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms,
and '[t]he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective
bargaining agent ....'
4. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J.
175, 179 (1960).
5. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y.S. 277, 281-82, 177 N.E. 83, 834 (1931).
6. H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 192 (1968). Since the state courts
view unions as democratic institutions, they will usually not uphold disciplinary action
where the union has attempted to frustrate the member's citizenship obligations such as
his right to testify before legislative hearings and freedom of speech. See Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929); Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.S.2d 283,
293, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78 (1958); Angrisani v. Steam, 167 Misc. 731, 3 N.Y.S.2d 701 (N.Y. City
Mun. Ct. 1938); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921).
7. "Every constitution that contained a reference to grounds for discipline provided at
least one general or 'catchall' prohibition that did not explicitly define the behavior outlawed . . . . In 13 unions, these general clauses were the only type found, while in 139
constitutions they were added to other prohibitions, more specific in nature.
"Certain general prohibitions, in practice, could be as definite and precise as a specific
prohibition. For instance, the offense most prevalently cited or proscribed--'violate the constitution'- could be defined by reference to specific constitutional provisions. Other general
phrases such as 'conduct unbecoming a member' or 'bringing the union into disrepute'
were perhaps far less determinate . . . . Other equally broad but less prevalent catchall
clauses prohibited 'malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance,' violating the 'duties, obligations, and fealty of a member,' and 'any dishonorable act."' U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL.
No. 1350,
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right to decide whether they would participate in union activities.9 Section
8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act made union coercion in this decision illegal. 0 However,
protection of employee rights has been limited by the power given the union
to enforce its own rules. In an attempt to make unions more democratic 2
Congress, in 1959, enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA).13 Union members were given equal rights to nominate
candidates, vote in elections, attend meetings, and express opinions as long
as union enforcement of reasonable rules was not impaired. 4
In discussing federal limitations placed upon union disciplinary powers,
this note will focus upon section 8 (b) (1) (A)' 5 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the "Bill of Rights" of the LMRDA, 6 and the judicially
7
created duty of fair representation.
UNION DiscIPLiNE UNDER SEarION 8 (b) (1) (A) oF THE NLRA

Enforcement of Internal Union Rules
When the National Labor Relations Board first interpreted section 8 (b)
(1) (A) it restricted the section to cases involving physical violence, intimidation, and economic reprisal. 5 In one of the earliest cases' 9 a strike was
called to force the employer to retain a hiring hall provision in the collective bargaining contract.2 0 The union had for some time discriminated
against nonmembers in operating this hiring hall. After an examination of
legislative history the Board determined that, to be in violation of section
8 (b) (1) (A), the union must have made "overtures to the employees relating
to their job or personal safety." 2' Although the strike violated another sec-

9. 29 U.S.C. §157 (1970). "Employees shall have the right to self-organization . . .to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities ......
10. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1)
to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157

....29 U.S.C. §158 (b) (1970).
11. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967).
12. See Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MoDEaN L. Rv.273,

282-83
13.
14.
15.

(1962).
29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1970).
29 U.S.C. §§411 (a) (1)- (2) (1970).
29 U.S.C. §158 (a) (1970).

16. 29 U.S.C. §411 (1970).
17. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). A union must "serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Id. at 177.
18. See NLR.B v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).19. National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948).
20. Id. at 976-77. Through the hiring hall procedure an employee would register with
the union when he was looking for work, and the employer would call the union to send
him qualified workers.
21. Local 12419, United Mine Workers, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 71 L.R.R.M. 1311, 1314
(1969).
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tion of the Act, 22

the union's primary objective was held to be protection

of the employment status of its members and not forcing nonmembers to
join the union. Since no violence was involved there was no transgression of
section 8 (b) (1) (A).2 3 Later refinements of this interpretation restricted
union action to internal union matters. 24 Recent cases have included the
purpose behind union action as a factor in determining the validity of a
union rule25

The legality of internal union discipline reached the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 2 6 Several members of a union
crossed picket lines and worked during a lawful economic strike. They were
found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a member" and fined from twenty to
one hundred dollars for their actions. The lower court, reading section
8 (b) (1) (A) literally, determined the fine to be within the phrase "restrain
or coerce," and thereby in violation of the section.27 The Supreme Court,
however, in reviewing the legislative history leading to enactment of section
8 (b) (1) (A), held Congress had not intended to interfere with the internal
28

affairs of unions.

The issue that divided the majority and the minority was a court enforced fine.29 Since membership is valuable when a union is strong, expulsion is more punitive than a reasonable fine. However, because weaker
unions cannot beneficially use expulsion as a means of enforcing fines, the
Court decided unions should have the choice of expulsion or court enforced
fines. 30 To justify its decision the Court held that court enforcement was a
"necessary consequence of the 'contract theory' of union membership"
prevalent when Congress enacted section 8 (b) (1) (A).- 1 Upholding what it

22. 29 U.S.C. §158 (b)(2) (1970). This section prohibits unions from causing employers
to discriminate against an employee in regard to hire or tenure of employment.
23. National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 986 (1948).

24. International Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 951, 955-57 (1949), aff'd sub. nom
American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,

344 U.S. 812 (1952). See Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964).
25. Local 138, Operating Engineers, 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 682 (1964). See Comment, Labor
Law: Union Fining as an Unfair Labor Practice Under Section 8 (b) (1) (A), 1966 DuKE L.J.
717.
26. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
27. "[U]nder that reading union members who cross their own picket lines would be regarded as exercising their rights under §7 to refrain from engaging in a particular concerted activity, and union discipline in the form of fines for such activity would therefore
'restrain or coerce' in violation of §8 (b) (1) (A) if the section's proviso is read to sanction
no form of discipline other than expulsion from the union." Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1966).
28. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184-90 (1967).
29. See Comment, Court Enforcement of Union Fines, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 273
(1968).
30. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1967).
31. Id. at 205. The minority felt there was no basis either historically or logically for
this conclusion. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text. However, the majority compared it with a commercial contract for which a lawsuit is the ordinary method of enforcement. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. RE.v. 1049,
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felt to be basic to the federal labor policy, the Court deemed the union's
right to protect its status by reasonable discipline more important than the
right of the employee to determine his participation.32
The minority interpreted the Court's decision as restricted to "a court
enforced reasonable fine," although the Court did not expressly limit its
holding.33 Two years later the Supreme Court restricted union disciplinary
actions in holding: 4
[Section] 8 (b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted
rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy . . .
imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union
members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule.
In light of this decision, union rules will not be upheld if they violate one
or more of these restrictions.
Legitimate Union Interests
For disciplinary action to be valid, a union must have a direct interest
in the activity covered by the rule. For example, a union has a valid interest
in fining or expelling members for working during a legal strike and may
prohibit this activity in its constitution or bylaws.3 5 Another legitimate concern is the unlimited piecework pay system under which employee earnings
are determined by the amount of output. 36 Unions have historically opposed
this system, fearing it would create competitive pressures and endanger the
unity of the work force.37 Restricting the effect of such a system falls within
the "union's traditional function of trying to serve the economic interests
of the group as a whole." 38 Although such a rule has an "impact beyond the

1055-56 (1951). Continental Turpentine & Rosin Co. v. Gulf Naval Stores Co., 244 Miss. 465,
142 So. 2d 200 (1962); Merchant's Ladies Garment Ass'n, Inc. v. Coat House of William
M. Schwartz, Inc., 152 Misc. 130, 273 N.Y.S. 317 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1934). A majority of
courts had previously held that courts could not force the union member to pay a fine.
See also Local 188, United Glass Workers v. Seitz, 65 Wash. 2d 640, 399 P.2d 74 (1965).
32. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180-90 (1967). The minority of the
Court felt that the basic purpose of the federal labor laws was to provide workers with
the freedom to determine their own activities without constant pressure by employers or
unions. Id. at 216-17.
33. Id. at 200.
34. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969).
35. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 208-12 (1967). See Rocket Freight
Lines, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 72 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1969); American Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.,
174 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 70 L.R.R.M. 1423 (1969).
36. L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 217-21 (4th ed. 1964). Although workers are usually provided with incentives for increasing their production under
this system, workers generally maintain about the same rate of output. "Workers who rise
much above the accepted rate are called 'speed artists,' 'company men,' and other uncomplementary names." Id. at 220.
37. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 431 (1969).
38. Id.
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confines of the union organization" the union may enforce it, since the rule
39
also concerns an internal union matter.
A union may "prescribe its own . . . rules [regarding] acquisition or re-

4
tention of membership" as expressed in the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A). 0
A bylaw prohibiting members from working with nonmembers is valid if the
union considers such action detrimental to its best interests. 41 Additionally,
a union may have a valid objective in determining which members should
receive work.42 However, disciplinary action will not be enforced where it
3
affects rights other than membership rights. In Progressive Mine Workersa multi-employer pension plan allowed employees to leave their jobs and
4
keep their pension funds so long as they paid a service fee to the union. 4
When two employees transferred to another mine the union refused to accept tender of their service fee, claiming the two employees had violated a
clause in its constitution prohibiting them from joining another union.45 The
union contended that the two employees forfeited their membership rights
and pension funds of more than 11,000 dollars. However, the constitutional
provision at issue prohibited only retention of membership and did not pertain to "continued payment of service fees as a means of maintaining eligibility" under the plan.4 6 The Board held that the union violated section
8 (b) (1) (A) by restricting the economic rights of the members where mem-

bership rights were not involved.

Conflicting Public Policies
Union disciplinary action will not be upheld when it conflicts with some
policy imbedded in the labor laws. For example, a union may not bring
disciplinary action against a member for filing charges with the Board without exhausting all internal union remedies" or for encouraging another
39. Id. at 431-32. See NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 49, 430 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir.
1970).
40. 29 U.S.C. §158 (b)(1)(A) (1970). See NLRB v. American Bakery Workers, Local 300,
411 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1969); Operative Potters, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 68 L.RIR.M. 1137
(1968).
41. Musicians, Local 802, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 71 L.R.R.M. 1228, 1231 (1969).
42. New York Typographical Union No. 6, 144 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1559 (1963), petition to
review denied, Cafero v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1964). The collective bargaining
agreement required the union to supply employers with skilled employees to operate their
composing rooms. One member was reclassified "not at trade" because he was employed
full-time in another occupation. Then he was dropped to the bottom of the seniority list
that was used to refer union members to employers. This action was held not to violate
§8 (b) (1) (A).
43. 173 N.L.R.B. No. 189, 70 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1968).
44. See Coal Producers' Ass'n, 165 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 65 L.R.R.M. 1304 (1967).
45. Progressive Mine Workers, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 189, 70 L.R.R.M. 1014, 1015 (1968)
(dual unionism usually means that, while remaining in one union, the member participates
in, or encourages the development of another union).

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968). See Meat
Cutters, Local 590, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 73 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1967).
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employee to file an unfair labor practice charge. 49 In these situations the
policy of self-regulation is in conflict with the policy permitting easy access
to Board procedures.5 0 Since the Board cannot initiate its own proceedings,
restricting access may prevent it from hearing grievances. 51
This conffict is not necessarily present when a member files a decertification petition with the Board attacking the union's existence. 52 The member
asks the Board to hold a new election, alleging the union is n6 longer representative of the majority of employees. 53 In this situation, in order to defend
its status, the union must have the ability to expel members, who could campaign against the union while retaining access to its strategy and tactics." The
union's right of self-protection does not conflict with public policy because
it does not hinder a member, already disenchanted with the union, from
resorting to the process of the Board.5 5 A fine does not give the union adequate
protection, since the member would still have access to union campaign tactics. Therefore, fining the member can only be considered a punitive reaction
to the decertification proceedings and is prohibited.5 6
Union disciplinary action may also conflict with public policy by forcing
members to breach their contracts. Although a union may have the right to
fine an employee for crossing its picket lines, it may not impose a fine if the
union-employer contract contains a no-strike, clause.57 The no-strike clause
prevails although another clause in the contract allows members to refuse to
49. Philadelphia Moving Picture Mach. Operators, Local 307 v. NLRB, 882 F.2d 598,
600 (3d Cir. 1967).
50. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968). See
Operating Engineers, Local 825, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 69 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1494 (1968).
51. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968). The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that these internal procedures could be required by the
union unless they "would impose unreasonable delay or hardship upon the complainant."
Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702, 707 (3d Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. The problem with the appellate ruling was that the
member would be required to guess how the court would finally rule. If he filed his
charge, he would have no defense against disciplinary action if the court came to a
different conclusion. Such a risk pressures the union member into not exercising his right
to use the procedures of the Board. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391
U.S. 418, 425 (1968). See also Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
52. Compare Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), with Molders, Local 125,
178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
53. 29 U.S.C. §159(c) (1) (1970). "Whenever a petition shall have been fied . . . (A)
by an employee alleging that a substantial number of employees . . . (ii) assert that the
individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized
by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined
in subsection (a) . .. the Board shall investigate such petition .... If the Board finds ...

that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and
shall certify the results thereof."
54. Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049, 1050 (1969).
55. Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46,48-49 (1965).
56. Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969). In that case
the dissenting members of the Board felt this was a direct repudiation of a previous decision making no distinction between fines and expulsion. See Van Camp Sea Food Co.,
Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 843 (1966).
57. Cf. Glaziers, Local 1162, 177 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 73 L.R.R.M. 1125, 1126 (1969).
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work when the employer breaches the agreement. Allowing unions to fine
members for refusing to violate their contracts would provide incentives for
breaches of collective bargaining agreements. Thus, the union's right to
enforce its rule is outweighed by the public policy that collective bargaining
agreements should be enforced.58
Reasonable Enforcement
A union may enforce a rule when it involves a legitimate union interest
and does not conflict with any public policy. The Supreme Court has required
that disciplinary action be "reasonably enforced against union members who
are free to leave the union and escape the rule."5 9 The Board has interpreted
the Supreme Court decisions as restricting unlawful discipline under section
8 (b) (1) (A) but not restricting the severity of otherwise lawful discipline.60
However, disciplinary action may violate section 8 (b) (1)(A) if the rule has
been given a previously inconsistent application by the union and the employer, or by a court or arbitrator.61 Also, union action must be based upon
a reasonable classification of employees and cannot conflict with a collective
bargaining agreement. 62
The Board will determine if a union is restricting the freedom of a member to leave the union and escape the rule. However, a problem arises where
the member has been fined, after his resignation, for actions committed before
his resignation. Since the rights involved are contractual, a member may not
be fined for actions committed after his resignation.63 As breaches of a con-

58. Local 12419, United Mine Workers, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 71 L.R.R.M. 1311, 1315
(1969). In Bricklayers, Local 2, 166 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 65 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1967), fines for
refusing to cross a picket line, which constituted a secondary boycott in violation of §8 (b) (4),
were refunded to the members by order of the Board.
59. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1968). See Machinists, Local 504, 185 N.L.R.B.
No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008, 1010 (1970). See also UAW, Local 488, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 75
L.R.R.M. 1242 (1970).
60. See Lithographers, Local 205, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 75 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1970); Communication Workers, Local 6222, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 75 L.R.R.M. 1324 (1970). In North
Jersey Newspaper, Local 173 v. Rakos, 110 N.J. Super. 77, 264 A.2d 453 (App. Div. 1970),
one union member was fined $750 for crossing a picket line, enticing another member to
cross it, and colluding with the company. In determining the reasonableness of the fine,

the court considered the nature and number of his offenses, the amount of profit resulting
from his actions, and current economic conditions. The union member not only earned
substantial income during this period, but also received a promotion. Since the fine was
to serve as a deterrent to others, $250 for each offense was considered reasonable. See also
Local 248 UAW v. Natzke, 36 Wis. 2d 237, 153 N.W.2d 602 (1967).
61.

New York Typographical Union, No. 6, 144 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1559 (1963).

62.

Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 190 (1962).

63. Machinists, Booster Lodge 405, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1006 (1970).
When a member joins the union he becomes subject to the provisions of the constitution
and may be disciplined for violating them. When he resigns all rights and duties under the
contract are extinguished. One union contended that voluntary resignation was impossible,
since neither its constitution nor its bylaws contained a procedure for doing so. This was
soundly rejected by the Board on the basis that leaving the union to avoid discipline has

been recognized by the Supreme Court as proper. Id.
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tract are not extinguished by cancellation of the agreement, a member may
only escape liability for actions committed after his effective resignation.64
The decision in Allis-Chalmers, permitting a fine for crossing picket lines,
assumed that the disciplined member enjoyed "full" membership in the
union.6 5 This may entail anything from a voluntary decision by the member
to fully engage in union activities to forced participation under a union
security clause16 Whether a union may fine a member who is only paying
dues under coercion remains unanswered. 67 The definition of a "full" member is also uncertain.
UNION DISCIPLINE UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND

DISCLOSURE ACT
Freedom of Speech
The LMRDA provides union members with a bill of rights, including the
right to nominate candidates, vote in elections, and attend meetings. 6 Section
101 (a) (2) of the Act6 9 is designed to protect those conversations that concern
union affairs.7 0 Materials contained in handbills,' 1 newspaper articles,72 or
on picket signs7a are also protected. However, use of an official letterhead
for a private purpose by a union officer during an election constitutes an

64. Id.

65. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 196 (1967).
66. Christensen, Union Fines and
Employee, 21 N.Y.U. CONFMEENCE ON
ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 194
contracts contain some provision for

Other Discipline: The Union, the Employer, and the
LABOR 835, 354-55 (1969). See L. REYNOLDS, LABOR

(4th ed. 1964). "More than four-fifths of all union
union security. Much the commonest [sic] provision

is a straight union shop. This leaves the employer free to hire at will; but after the worker
has served his probationary period and becomes a regular member of the plant labor force,
he is required to join the union. If he declines to do so, or if he drops out of the union,
the employer must discharge him. A variant of the union shop is the maintenance-ofmembership clause. This does not compel any worker to join; but if he chooses to join, he
must then remain in for the duration of the contract as a condition of employment. Another rather rare variant is the agency shop, under which a worker who declines to join is
obliged to pay the union a fee-usually set at the level of the monthly dues- in return
for the collective bargain service which it is rendering him." Id. at 194.
67. See Note, Labor Policy: Judicial Enforcement of Fines After Allis-Chalmers, 53
CORNELL

L. REv. 1094, 1096 (1968).

68. 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1970). Section 411 (a) (1) gives union members the right to
nominate candidates, vote in elections, and attend meetings, subject to reasonable union
rules. Section (a) (2) provides union members with freedom of speech and assembly. Section
(a) (3)relates to dues, initiation fees, and assessments. Section (a) (4) relates to the exhaustion of internal union remedies. Section (a) (5) requires that the member be accorded
due process.
69. 29 U.S.C. §411 (a) (2) (1970).
70. Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, 262 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d
212 (5th Cir. 1969) (protected conversations include arguments, questions, and accusations).
71. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965).
72. Deacon v. Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 273 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
73. Graham v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F.
Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss2/8

8

Robbins:
Limits ofOF
Union
Disciplinary
Power Under Federal
UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.Law
XXIV
improper use of a method of communication and is not protected as free
speech.

74

Fines, if imposed for use of communications protected by the LMRDA,
violate section 101 (a) (2) of the Act. Since neither libel nor slander are included within constitutionally protected speech75 it has been argued that
they are not protected speech within the LMRDA. In Salzhandler v. Caputo8
a member distributed a leaflet accusing a union officer of "improper conduct
with regard to union funds" and referred to him as a "petty robber." Holding that the member had a right to express his opinions, the court determined
it was immaterial whether his statements were true or false. 7 Since honest
union management would be served by allowing such statements,78 the Court
reasoned it would frustrate the purpose of the Act to force the member to
determine whether his statements were libelous.
Attempts have also been made to exclude threats of violence 79 and
"malicious villification" 0 from the protection of the statute. In determining
whether a communication constitutes a threat, a tribunal must consider the
speaker's intent, the surrounding circumstances, and the reasonableness of the
interpretation by the other party.8 ' Malicious libel or slander requires a
balancing of truth or falsity, privilege, fair comment, and the speaker's intent.8 2 Since the procedures of a union tribunal are not suited to the balancing

and determination of such factors, these communications cannot be restricted
by unions .

3

Restrictions on Communications
A member's right to express his views is restricted by the union's right to
"'enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward
the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that
s4
would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations."
These exceptions to the free speech provision have often been used by unions
to justify disciplinary action. If a member encourages other members of his
local to form an independent union, he has clearly attacked the union as an
institution and can be disciplined for advocation of "dual unionism."8s

74. Gulickson v. Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
75. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
76. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
77. Id. at 451.
78. Id. at 450. See Barbour v. Sheet Metal Workers, 401 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968).
79. Kelsey v. Local 8, Theatrical Stage Employees, 294 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
80. Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1965).
81. Kelsey v. Local 8, Theatrical Stage Employees, 294 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (E.D. Pa.
1968). See United States v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1966).
82. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1963).
83. Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1965).
84. 29 U.S.C. §411 (a) (2) (1970).
85. Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 279 F. Supp. 747, 756 (E.D. Mo.
1967). See note 45 supra.
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Similarly, a union may validly fine a member for leading a work stoppage
when the union has an obligation to continue work during contract negotiations. These fines are justified because such action frustrates the union's performance of legal obligations 8 6
Statements critical of the union may nevertheless be protected if they
are directed primarily toward union management or policies5s For example,
if an accusation is made that the union has misappropriated funds, the statement is actually aimed at the officers involved and is not an attack on the
union as an institution.88 A letter written to the press criticizing union
activity is also protected, even if it is not confined to the expression of views
within the confines of the union framework. 9
A member may be guilty of interfering with a union's obligations if he
persuades other members to refuse to pay dues.9 0 However, when he has good
reason to believe that the method employed by the union to collect dues is
illegal, disciplinary action cannot not be validly imposed. Any rule that
01
would force him to remain silent in such a situation is unreasonable.
Union Officers or Agents
The LMRDA protects the rights of the union officer as well as of the
rank-and-file member.92 Contending that the Act protects only the rights of a
member, several unions have argued that in dismissing an officer or employee,
such as a business agent, his membership in the union has remained unaffected. 93 In refusing to utilize this argument, the courts have held that an
elected officer may express his opinion as freely as any other member. 9
Another problem occurs when a union attempts to remove an official for
his political activities. He may actively support a candidate for union office
against the incumbent management without fearing disciplinary action.9 5
If a dismissal occurs shortly after an election, the burden of justifying the

86. Falcone v. Dantinne, 288 F. Supp. 719, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,

420 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1969).
87. Farnum v. Kurtz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2794 (1969). See Fulton Lodge No. 2 v. Nix, 415
F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969).
88. Giordani v. Upholsterers Union No. 36, 403 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1968).
89. Farnum v. Kurtz, 73 L.R.R.M. 2794, 2795 (1969).
90. Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, 330 F.2d 999, 1000 (2d Cir. 1964).

91. Id.
92. 29 U.S.C. §411 (a) (2) (1970).
93. Since §411 (a) (2) states that every member shall have these rights, the argument

is made that the section does not apply to members in their capacity as officers or employees of the union. See Retail Clerks, Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp.
1012, 1020-21 (D.D.C. 1969).

94. Since one of the purposes of the Act is to protect "the exercise of democratic
rights of free speech and assembly at union meetings involving matters bearing on the
affairs of the full membership," union officers have a duty to express their opinions. DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752 (D.N.J. 1968).
95. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
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discharge is placed upon the union.96 Additionally, a union may not discipline
an official for his outspoken opposition to business matters properly before
the membership, since it would force him to choose between his rights as a
member and his job. 97 An official may, of course, be removed from office on
a legitimate charge of malfeasance, since in such a situation the rights of
free expression and political activity are not involved. 98
Discipline and Due Process
Section 101 (a) (5) of the LMRDA, 99 the due process section of the union
member's bill of rights, provides that a member may not be "fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues" unless he
has been "served with written specific charges . . . given a reasonable time

to prepare his defense, [and] afforded a full and fair hearing." 100
For union action to constitute "other discipline" within the meaning of
section 101 (a) (5), it must carry almost the same severity as a fine, a suspension, or an expulsion. A reprimand that does not result in a loss of wages is
a mere "slap on the wrist" and hence not covered by the section.10' Union
action affecting employment opportunities may also not be severe enough
to constitute discipline if a member has already lost these opportunities
10 2
through unsatisfactory work performance.
The union member may not be disciplined for offenses that are not contained in the constitution or bylaws.10 3 Moreover, if evidence establishes
that a member has violated a provision of the union constitution, but not the
one with which the member was charged, the union's action cannot be upheld.10 4 In International Board of Boilermakers v. Braswello5 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed disciplinary action
against a member who had accosted the union's business agent during an
argument. The union charged the member under provisions prohibiting
"threats to the union as an organization" and using force in preventing an
officer from discharging his duties. The Fifth Circuit held that the member's

96. Retail Clerks, Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D.D.C.
1969).
97. DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752-53 (D.N.J. 1968).
98. Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 306 F.2d 152, 153 (3d Cir. 1962).
99. 29 U.S.C. §411 (a) (5) (1970).
100. Id.
101. In Bougie v. Carpenters, 67 L.R.R.M. 2402, 2403 (1968), the union member did
not claim lost wages or other actual damages resulting from the reprimand. His only claim
was for damage to his reputation. This was not considered severe enough to be disciplined.
See Duncan v. Peninsula Shipbuilders Ass'n, 394 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1968). See also Keenan
v. Metropolitan Dist. Council, 266 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
102. Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos, Local 446, 320 F.2d 271, 272 (3d Cir. 1963).
103. See Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1965); International
Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 313 (9th Cir. 1965).
104. Allen v. International Alliance of Theatrical Operators, 338 F.2d 309, 316-17 (5th
Cir. 1964).
105. 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968).
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actions were not violative of these sections, since the blow was delivered in
anger and for no other reason.106
Unlike section 101 (a) (2),107 section 101 (a) (5) has been held to apply
"only to a union member's membership status" and not "to his status as an
officer or employee of the union."108 After reviewing the section's legislative
history, numerous courts have determined that it does not apply to removal
from union office, as that concerns a member's employment status. 0 9
The Second Circuit has adopted a similar approach in cases involving a
member's employment status outside of the union."3 0 In Detroy v. American
Guild of Variety Artists"' a union member refused to abide by an adverse
arbitration award. The union blacklisted him for failing to follow its orders
to arbitrate. Although acknowledging the union's interest in performing its
contractual obligations, the court held that the union must follow the .procedures set out in section 101 (a) (5).12 In Figueroa v. National Maritime
Union"13 the Second Circuit distinguished the unilateral discipline utilized
in Detroy on the basis that the union did not have a predetermined contractual obligation to blacklist the member for proscribed activity. The policy
of the ship owners in Figueroa,however, was not to employ any seaman convicted of a crime involving narcotics. In its collective bargaining agreement
the union had agreed to give consideration to such convictions in registering
106. Id. at 198-99. See Christensen, supra note 66, at 347.
107. See text accompanying notes 92-98 supra.
108. Hill v. Aro Corp., 275 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
109. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 341-42 (9th Cir.
1964); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 204 F. Supp. 241, 243 (D. Conn. 1962);
Mamula v. Local 1211, United Steel Workers, 202 F. Supp. 348, 350 (W.D. Pa. 1962);
Hamilton v. Guinan, 199 F. Supp. 562, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Burton v. Independent
Packinghouse Workers, 199 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D. Kan. 1961); Jackson v. The Martin Co.,
180 F. Supp. 475, 480-81 (D. Md. 1960); Bennett v. Hoisting Engineers, Local 701, 207 F.
Supp. 861, 862 (D. Ore. 1960); Strauss v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 297,
800 (E.D. Pa. 1959). One reason given for allowing dismissal from office without due process is that it may "prevent dissipation or misappropriation of funds." Grand Lodge of
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 835 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1964).
110. Other courts have also taken this approach. In Lucas v. Kenney, 220 F. Supp. 188,
190 (N.D. Ili. 1963), a union member asserted that, under union rules, the union had a

duty to secure work for him when it was available. The court held that the denial of
work did not constitute discipline, since it affected employment rights only. This reasoning
has also been applied where the union failed to process a member's grievance. Allen v.
Armored Car Chauffeurs Union, 185 F. Supp. 492, 494-95 (D.N.J. 1960). But see Catanzaro
v. Soft Drink Workers Union, 65 L.R.R.M. 2092 (1967) and Burris v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277, 279 (W.D.N.C. 1963). In Hall v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 281
F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Cal. 1968), the collective bargaining agreement established a grievance
committee, consisting of representatives from both the employer and the union. In situations where the employer does not wish to oppose the union's complaints against one of
its members the union may have as much power as when it has complete control. Although
recognizing the union's power in this situation the court ruled that §101 (a) (5) was inapplicable, since rights under the collective bargaining agreement do not affect membership in
the union. But see Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
111. 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
112. Id. at 81.
113.

342 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1965).
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seamen suitable for employment. 114 Several members were deprived of further referrals because of narcotics violations that had occurred long before the
union's contract had been negotiated. If the seamen had chosen to dispute
the fact that they had been convicted, the action by the union would have
constituted discipline and adherence to the procedural requirements of section 101 (a) (5) would have been required. 115 However, since the members
admitted the application of the provision, the union's action was equivalent
116
to rejecting a physically unqualified applicant.
FAIR REPRESENTATION

Fair Representation in the Federal Courts
When a majority of employees in a particular unit designates a union as its
representative, the union becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for that
unit.

17

Since in this situation the union can have an enormous effect on the
tempered by the union's

economic rights of employees, 1"8 such power has been

duty of fair representation. As the exclusive agent the union has a duty "to
serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward
any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to
avoid arbitrary conduct.""19
Although contract negotiations are conducted only between the union
and the employer, an employee has the right under section 301 (a) of the
NLRA12 ° to sue his employer for a violation of the agreement.' 2' However,
before asserting this right an employee must resort to the grievance procedure
established by the employer and the union. 2 2 In Republic Steel Corp. v.

114. Id. at 402.
115. See Christensen, Union Discipline Under Federal Law: Institutional Dilemmas in
an Industrial Democracy, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 227, 232-39 (1968).
116. See Figueroa v. National Maritime Union, 342 F.2d 400, 406 (2d Cir. 1965).
117. 29 U.S.C. §159 (a) (1970). NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir.
1970) and NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969) discuss the
effect of §9 (a) on minority picketing. See NLRB v. SuCrest Corp., 409 F.2d 765 (2d Cir.
1969).
118. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). "Congress has seen fit
to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a
legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents ....
Thus only the union may contract the employee's terms and conditions of employment, and
provisions for processing his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to
strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. The
employee may disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by them." Id. at 180.
119. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
120. 29 U.S.C. §307 (a) (1970).
121. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962). An employee may join the
union as a defendant in his suit if it facilitates matters. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187
(1967).
122. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). This requirement is
necessary in order to provide a uniform system of settling grievances and maintaining industrial self-government. Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Limitation on Union
Control of Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1047-48 (1970). "[C]ontractual
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Maddox1s' the Supreme Court suggested that "if the union refuses to press
or only perfunctorily presses the individual's claim the employee would not
be bound by the outcome of a decision through the grievance machinery."'12 4
Some courts, in interpreting this decision, have held that if the collective
bargaining agreement contains a provision to the effect that decisions under
the grievance procedures will be final and binding on all parties, employees
will be precluded from suing unless the union breaches its duty. 12 5
A union violates its duty of fair representation only when its conduct is
"arbitrary, discrininatory, or in bad faith."' 2 Since employee conflicts are
expected, unions must be allowed a "wide range of reasonableness" in satisfying the interests of all the employees in the collective unit. 27 Therefore,
a union may oppose the position of some members it represents or support
one group against another in good faith. 28 This standard also allows a
union to make a good faith determination that a claim is not worthy of processing29 although it is later determined to be a legitimate claim."30
While unions are given wide discretion in satisfying conflicting interests,
the duty of fair representation can be breached by improper processing of the
grievance. 31 ' When a union fails to inform a member of an arbitration hearprovisions should be liberally interpreted so as to require resort to such procedures whenever a contrary result is not dearly indicated." Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d
285, 288 (5th Cir. 1967). See United Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); General Teamsters Union v. Blue Cab Co., 353 F.2d 687 (7th
Cir. 1965); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Haynes Corp., 296 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1961).
123. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
124. Id. at 652.
125. Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1967); Miller v. Spector
Freight Systems, Inc., 366 F.2d 92, 93 (1st Cir. 1966); Haynes v. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1966); Simmons v. Union News Co., 341 F.2d 531,
532-33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 884 (1965) (Warren, C.J., Black, J. dissenting);
Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 .U.S. 826 (1963);
Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658, 666-67 (6th Cir. 1961); Rivera v. NMU Pension
Welfare & Vacation Plan, 288 F. Supp. 874, 877 (E.D. La. 1968); Fuller v. Highway Truck
Drivers &-Helpers Local 107, 233 F. Supp. 115, 118-19 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See also Comment,
Section 301 (a) and the Employee: An Illusory Remedy, 35 FoaDHAm L. Rxv. 517 (1967).
126. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
127. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1958).
128. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 849 (1964).
129. Pyznski v. New York Cent. R.R., 421 F.2d 854, 864 (2d Cir. 1970).
130. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967).
131. Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 195, 199 (4th
Cir. 1963). In Bazarte v. Transportation Union, 305 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Pa. 1969), the court
listed six reasons why the jury could have determined that the union breached its duty:
(I) his union representative failed to adequately and fully prepare a proper defense for
the member at the railroad hearing; (2) the union representative failed to advise him of
the steps necessary to appeal his discharge to officials in the department in which he was
employed; (3) the same representative failed to bring all the relevant facts to the attention
of other officers of the union; (4) other members of the union breached the responsibility
of their office by not becoming fully acquainted with all the relevant facts of the case;
(5) the union lulled the member into a false sense of euphoria by not advising him that
they were ceasing their efforts on his behalf; and (6) the decision of the union officers
not to fight for the member's job was based on an irrelevant consideration, the question
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ing32 or when the union representative does not investigate a complaint
thoroughly'. 3 or does not advise him of the proper procedure of appeal,"1
there is a breach of this duty.
Although the standards to be applied have not been specifically defined,13
a breach is usually clear when it involves racial discrimination. 136 However,
more "[s]ubtle discriminations or simple unfairness will be almost impossible
to prove.'"137 Despite the existence of many valid reasons for suspecting unjust discrimination,13 an employee is usually left with little hope of court
assistance."39

Breach of Duty of Fair Representation- An Unfair Labor Practice
The concept of "fair representation" has recently been extended by the
National Labor Relations Board through the use of section 8 (b) (1) (A) of
the NLRA.40 If the union restrains or coerces the employee in his decision
concerning involvement in union activities, such a breach may be an unfair
labor practice.14 1 Most cases under this section have involved racially discriminatory practices. 14 2 However, refusals to process grievances have been
of his dual employment, since he had not been charged with a violation of the company's
rules in that regard nor found guilty of such a violation. Id. at 444.
132. Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 258 F. Supp. 235, 239 (E.D. Va.
1966).
133. De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 285 (1st Cir.
1970).
134. Bazarte v. Transportation Union, 305 F. Supp. 443, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
135. Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 46
(1959).
136. Tunstall v. Locomotive Firemen, Lodge 76, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
137. Levy, supra note 122, at 1055.
138. Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the
Problem, 24 U. MD. L. REv. 233 (1964). "First, the worker and the union might merely
have a bonafide disagreement as to the interpretation of a provision of the collective
agreement, or they might otherwise disagree as to the merits of his grievance or claim.
Second, the worker might think he has reason to fear union favoritism. A worker might
believe that his interests are either opposed or inadequately represented because he
belongs to a disfavored racial, ethnic, sex or age class or that he is personally obnoxious to
the union leaders or membership .... Finally, there might be reason to believe that overzealous concern for institutional interests of the union and the collective enterprise will induce union officials to trade off unrelated grievances or make wholesale settlements that
relinquish some meritorious claims or even to accept resolutions, that very much lack in
personal justice, of some grievances." Id. at 245-46.
139. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L. REv. 1435, 1471 (1963).
140. 29 U.S.C. §158 (b) (1) (A) (1970).
141. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 16-17 (5th Cir. 1966).
142. Id. at 18; Cargo Handlers, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 62 L.R.R.M. 1228, 1231
(1966); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 898 (1964); Industrial Metal
Workers, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574 (1964). Violations under §8 (b) (1) (A) range from
refusals to process because of race to refusals to process based upon considerations of
political expedience. See Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
1961).
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held violative of section 8 (b) (1) (A) where animosity toward the member
was present. 43 A violation has also been found where the real reason behind
the*union's refusal was the employee's opposition at a union meeting to the
business agent's defense of the employer's overtime policy. 4 The standards
to be applied under section 8 (b) (1) (A) have not been specifically defined, 45
since the concept of fair representation under this section has only been
recently developed.
EXHAUSTION OF INTERNAL UNION REMEDsS

A union may not restrict members' rights to institute an action against it
with the National Labor Relations Board. However, section 101 (a) (4) of
the LMRDA4 6 requires a member to exhaust reasonable internal remedies
before suing his union under the Act. 47 Generally, courts will require exhaustion unless: the union's violation is clear,-48 resort to a biased tribunal
is futile, 49 the appellate procedure is uncertain, 50 or when "the offense
charged was not one specified in the union constitution."'' Since the member
must do more than merely allege that one of these situations exists,1 2 his
suit may be dismissed if, in a previous case, he has shown his complete
53
familiarity with union procedure.
Although courts may require a member to follow union procedures, he
may not be disciplined for suing prematurely. In Ryan v. InternationalBoard
of Electrical Workers5 the union expelled a member after his suit against
the union was dismissed on the basis of an inadequate exhaustion of remedies.
The court held that a union constitutional provision providing for such a

143. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 68 L.R.R.M. 1417, 1418 (1968);
Canton Mfg. Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 68 L.R.R.M. 1186, 1187 (1968); Port Drum Co.,
170 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 67 L.R.R.M. 1506, 1507-08 (1968).
144. Automotive Plating Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 67 L.R.R.M. 1609, 1610 (1968).
145. Truck Drivers, Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
146. 29 U.S.C. §411 (a) (4) (1970). "No labor organization shall limit the right of any

member thereof to institute an action in any court ...Provided, That any such member
may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a fourmonth lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative
proceedings.....
147. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); Sheridan v.
Local 2, Liquor Salesmen's Union, 303 F. Supp. 999, 1004-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). One reason
given for this exhaustion requirement is that it conserves judicial resources by allowing

union tribunals to decide cases or clarify the issues before they reach the court.
148. Sheridan v. Local 2, Liquor Salesmen's Union, 303 F. Supp. 999, 1004-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
149.

Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, 530 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1964).

150. Tirino v. Local 164, Bartenders, 282 F. Supp. 809, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
151. Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1965). See Libutti v.
DiBrizzi, 337 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1964); Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the
Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 209 (1960).
152. Johnson v. Rockhold, 293 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
153. Bougie v. Carpenters, 67 L.R.R.M. 2402, 2404 (1968).
154. 361 F2d 942 (7th Cir. 1966).
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penalty was inconsistent with the congressional policy of providing members
with free access to the courts. 15
Before suing under section 301 (a)' 56 a union member must follow the
established grievance procedures. 57 Since a decision made under this pro51
cedure may prevent a member from suing,5
avoidance of the grievance
machinery is desirable. If the employer's conduct amounts to a rejection of
the procedure 9 or an effort to comply would be clearly futile,6 ° the grievance procedures may be bypassed. Thus, employees alleging discriminatory
practices by both employer and union are not required to exhaust the established remedies.1 6 1 Additionally, an employee may bypass them where the
contract provides that only the union has power to appeal through the griev1
ance procedure. 62
REMEDIES

Section (8) (b) (1) (A)
The usual remedy for a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A) includes a Board
directive ordering the union to "cease and desist from" its illegal activities. 163
Members will also be reimbursed for paying unlawfully imposed fines16 4 and,
if expelled, are usually reinstated.1 65 Where a more complex remedy is required the Board can adapt its order to particular situations.166 In Operating
Engineers, Local 825167 the union was ordered to reimburse a member for
any losses incurred in relation to union insurance, pension, or welfare benefits
during the length of his expulsion.

155.

Id. at 946. This would block access to the courts by forcing the member to forego

his suit, or risk the union's penalty if his case is dismissed.

156. 29 U.S.C. §301 (a) (1970).
157. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
158. See text accompanying notes 120-125 supra.
159. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
160. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1969).
161. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). See Lusk v. Eastern
Prods. Corp., 427 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1970); Desrosiers v. American Cyanimid Co., 377 F.2d
864 (2d Cir. 1967); Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 338 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964).
162. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
163. NLRB v. American Bakery Workers, Local 300, 411 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.
1969); Lithographers, Local 205, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 75 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1970); Operative
Potters, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 68 L.R.R.M. 1137, 1139 (1968).
164. Cf. Machinists, Lodge 405, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1007 (1970);
Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049, 1050 (1969); District 50, Local

12419, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 71 L.R.R.M. 1311, 1316 (1969).
165. Cf. Meat Cutters, Local 590, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 73 L.R.R.M. 1529, 1531 (1970);
Operating Eng'rs, Local 825, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 69 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1494 (1968).
166. See Progressive Mine Workers, Local 167, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 189, 70 L.R.R.M. 1014,
1015 (1968).
167. 173 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 69 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1494 (1968).
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Bill of Rights
Under section 102 of the LMRDA, 68 which provides for "such relief as
may be appropriate," the disciplined member "may recover for all damages
directly and proximately resulting from a violation of the Act."' 6 9 Compensatory damages for loss of wages or injury to reputation are usually allowed. 70 However, the courts are split on whether punitive damages are
appropriate relief. As the section specifically provides for relief, one court
held that punitive damages are not available to the union member because
they are not strictly in the nature of relief. 17' The Fifth Circuit, however,
criticized this decision as too narrow. In holding that punitive damages are
appropriate the court determined that the purposes of the LMRDA in curbing abuses would be better served by granting punitive damages in cases
72
involving malice, gross fraud, wanton conduct, or violence.
The courts are also split on whether a union member is entitled to a jury
trial. The seventh amendment preserves the right of jury trial where it existed under the common law.'73 One court has taken the view that section 102
was essentially "an equity proceeding for reinstatement as a member of the
Local Union, with the recovery of money damages being merely an incident
to such relief."' 74 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits, however, have attacked
this reasoning, asserting that there should be no distinction "between rights
existing under common law and rights established by enacted law, where
the relief sought is an award of damages."' 7 5
The conflict between strict and broad interpretations of section 102 also
arises when a union member requests reimbursement for legal fees. Under two
other sections of the LMRDA176 Congress has specifically provided for attorney's fees. Since these fees are not specifically mentioned in section 102,
a majority of the courts dealing with the question have determined that the
legislative history requires a finding that they cannot be awardedy7 This is
168. 29 U.S.C. §412 (1970).
169. Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965). See also McCraw
v. United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing, 341 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1965).
170. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018 (4th
Cir. 1965). Cf. Keenan v. Metropolitan Dist. Council, 266 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
171. Cole v. Hall, 35 F.R.D. 4, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), af'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d

881 (2d Cir. 1965).
172. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1968).
See Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 App. Div. 2d 331, 289 N.Y.S.2d 792 (4th Dep't 1963).
173. U.S. CONSr. amend. VII.
174. McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing, 341 F.2d 705, 709-10 (6th
Cir. 1965) (emphasis added).
175. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 888 F.2d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 1968);
Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir. 1965).
176. 29 U.S.C. §§431 (c), 501 (b) (1970).
177. Jacques v. Local 1418, Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 857, 860 (E.D. La.
1965); Leonard v. M.I.T. Employee's Union, 225 F. Supp. 937, 940 (D. Mass. 1964); McCraw
v. United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing, 216 F. Supp. 655, 664 (E.D. Tenn. 1963),
aff'd on other grounds, 841 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 952 (D. Conn.), aI'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).
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based on the generally accepted rule that "attorney's fees are not ordinarily
recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing
1
therefor." 8
Taking a broader view, the Third Circuit felt that Congress did not
intend to have the union member's bill of rights diminished by his inability
to finance litigation: 179
In construing the statute the court must consider the purpose of
its enactment, the evil to be eradicated, the object to be obtained and
recognize the construction that would best effectuate those standards
.... With this in mind the interpretation reached by this court is
consonant with the Congressional desire of passing legislation that will
afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and
the public generally.
The court determined that attorney's fees could be awarded in equity since
"allowance of such costs in appropriate situations is part of the historic equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts."' 180
Fair Representation
A union will not be liable for the total loss incurred by a member because
of an illegal discharge or other grievance.'-' Only an increase in damages
resulting from the union's failure or refusal to process the grievance properly
will be imposed. 8 2 However, "the increment of damages [may be] virtually
de minimus."' 13 Additionally, if a discharge is legal, the union will not be

178. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
179. Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 355 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040
(1968). "If the disciplined member is given no interim protection, the union has a double
incentive to delay, complicate, and otherwise protract the litigation. Due to the disparity of
financial resources the legal struggle is inherently unequal, but without interim protection,
the individual is nearly helpless.
"The availability of the damage remedy is but small help. The plaintiff's lawyer may
continue the fight with the hope of ultimately winning an award from which he can
collect a fee, but the uncertainty of victory and the political obstacles to collecting from
the union treasury may make this a poor risk. The plaintiff may be confronted with
demands for cash outlay for transcripts, printed records, and briefs. His anticipated damage
award is seldom useful collateral to finance these outlays.
"These obstacles are nearly insuperable when a lone individual is pitted against the
union." Summers, supra note 151, at 221. See also Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under
the Landrum-Griflln Act, 82 HA~v. L. R~v. 727, 764-68 (1969); Comment, The Furtherance
of Union Democracy: Providing for Counsel Fees in Labor Union Members' Bill of Rights
Suits, 31 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 643, 647-48 (1970).
180. Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 354 (3d Cir. 1967). See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
181. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967).
182. Id. See De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st
Cir. 1970).
183. St. Clair v. Teamsters, Local 515, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969).
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indebted to the member although it still violated its duty by refusing or
18 4
failing to process his grievance properly.
CONCLUSION

While contract theory has molded much of the law relating to discipline,
it should be accorded less importance in the light of the immense power of
5
unions and the expectations of union members and the general public.18
At the present time neither section 8 (b) (1) (A) nor the LMRDA Bill of Rights
has much effect within the context of collective bargaining agreements or
grievance procedures. Although unions are limited by the duty of fair representation in these areas, they are provided with very broad guidelines in meeting this duty. Union members can be provided with more protection if the
concepts under section 8 (b) (1) (A) and the LMRDA Bill of Rights are also
applied within these areas.
CHARLES D. ROBBINS

184. Id.
185. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND TnE LEGAL PROCESS (1968). "The democratic
myth and aspiration of the union movement, expressed in the general structure of union
constitutions, in the rhetoric of the labor movement, and in the political acceptance of
collective bargaining and the legislative scheme that supports it, constitutes a general holding
forth - a promise - to the member and the public by the unions which importantly conditions fairness between member and union. This conclusion is backed by the fact that
the member does not read the constitution with care if he reads it at all. Nor is he able
to project specific provisions forward to concrete cases. His expectations root, and rightly

so, in the document's general structure, in the general holding forth, in the grand design
of unions, collective bargaining, and industrial democracy," Id. at 196.
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